




Abstract. Every truth-functional three-valued propositional logic can be conservatively
translated into the modal logic S5. We prove this claim constructively in two steps. First,
we deﬁne a Translation Manual that converts any propositional formula of any three-
valued logic into a modal formula. Second, we show that for every S5-model there is an
equivalent three-valued valuation and vice versa. In general, our Translation Manual gives
rise to translations that are exponentially longer than their originals. This fact raises the
question whether there are three-valued logics for which there is a shorter translation into
S5. The answer is aﬃrmative: we present an elegant linear translation of the Logic of
Paradox and of Strong Three-valued Logic into S5.
Keywords: Three-valued logic, Modal logic, Conservative translations, Expressivity.
1. Introduction
Translations of one logic into another logic might serve as a bridge to carry
over technical results and philosophical insights. The translations of classical
propositional logic into intuitionistic propositional logic that appeared in the
literature around the 1930s all proved the relative consistency of classical
propositional logic: if intuitionistic propositional logic is consistent, then so
is classical propositional logic. The translation of intuitionistic propositional
logic into the modal logic S4, based on Go¨del’s [9], strongly supports the
provability interpretation of intuitionistic logic. Not all of these mappings of
one logic into another are translations in the same sense. Some of them are
only conservative mappings, others are conservative translations.1 A conser-
vative mapping  of a logic L1 into a logic L2 is a function that preserves
valid formulas in both ways:
|=L1 ϕ iﬀ |=L2 (ϕ).
1We take over Feitosa and D’Ottaviano’s [8] terminology. They also provide a review
of a variety of notions of translations of one logic into another logic and a discussion of the
historical translations of the 1930s [8, pp. 211–217]. See also D’Ottaviano and Feitosa [7].
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The notion of a conservative mapping is too blunt an instrument for study-
ing translations of three-valued logics into modal logic. Let us give two
examples. First, the identity function (ϕ) = ϕ conservatively maps the
Logic of Paradox (LP ) [14] into classical propositional logic, because LP
has exactly the same valid formulas as classical propositional logic. Second,
the function (ϕ) = p ∧ ¬p (where p is some atomic formula) conserva-
tively maps Strong Three-valued Logic (K3) [10,11] into classical proposi-
tional logic, because K3 does not have any valid formulas. For our present
purposes we therefore need a notion of translation that makes sharper dis-
tinctions.
The notion of a conservative translation gives us precisely what is required
for our current investigations. A conservative translation  of a logic L1 into
a logic L2 is a function that preserves valid arguments in both ways:
Π |=L1 ϕ iﬀ (Π) |=L2 (ϕ).
It is easy to see that the conservative mappings of LP and K3 into classical
propositional logic are no conservative translations.
The set-up of our paper is as follows. First, we give a general definition of a
truth-functional three-valued propositional logic. Second, we deﬁne a Trans-
lation Manual that converts any propositional formula of any three-valued
logic into a modal formula. Third, we show that because for every S5-model
there is a translationally equivalent three-valued valuation and vice versa,
every truth-functional three-valued propositional logic can be conservatively
translated into the modal logic S5. Finally, we present a linear translation
that conservatively translates both LP and K3 into S5.
2. Three-valued Logics
A propositional language is a set of formulas built from a set P = {p, p′, . . .}
of atomic formulas and a set O = {⊗0,⊗′0, . . . ,⊗1,⊗′1, . . .} of operators (the
subscript indicates an operator’s arity). The propositional language LOP is
the smallest set (in terms of set-theoretical inclusion) satisfying the following
two conditions:
(i) P ⊆ LOP
(ii) If ⊗n ∈ O and ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ LOP , then ⊗n(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) ∈ LOP .
We refer to elements of this propositional language as propositional formulas.
(If O = {¬1,∨2,∧2,→2}, then LOP is just the familiar language of proposi-
tional logic.) In a three-valued logic propositional formulas are interpreted
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by way of three-valued valuations. A three-valued valuation v on P is a func-
tion v : P → {a, b, c}, where {a, b, c} is a set of three distinct truth-values.
A valuation v therefore assigns to each atomic formula p in P exactly one
of the three truth-values a, b, and c. A valuation v can be extended to a
valuation v∗ that assigns to each propositional formula ϕ in LOP exactly one
of the three truth-values, using truth-tables for all operators that occur in
ϕ. A truth-table for an operator ⊗n is nothing but an n-placed function
f⊗n : {a, b, c}n → {a, b, c} that yields the truth-value of a complex formula
⊗n(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) on the basis of the truth-values of its constituent formulas
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn.
Definition 2.1. Let v be a three-valued valuation on P. Then v can be
extended to a three-valued valuation v∗ on LOP as follows:
v∗(p) = v(p)
v∗(⊗n(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) = f⊗n(〈v∗(ϕ1), . . . , v∗(ϕn)〉).
Extended valuations do not sufﬁce to deﬁne three-valued validity. We
need to stipulate which truth-values are the designated truth-values for the
premises and which ones are designated for the conclusion.2 Accordingly,
the concept |=XY3 of three-valued validity is relative to a set X ⊆ {a, b, c}
of designated truth-values for the premises and a set Y ⊆ {a, b, c} of desig-
nated truth-values for the conclusion. An argument from a set Π of premises
to a conclusion ϕ is XY-valid (notation: Π |=XY3 ϕ) if and only if for each
valuation v it holds that if v∗(ψ) ∈ X for all ψ ∈ Π, then v∗(ϕ) ∈ Y.
3. A Translation Manual for Three-valued Logics
We now present a Translation Manual that translates any three-valued logic
thus deﬁned into S5. For clarity we ﬁrst brieﬂy discuss S5. The modal logic
S5 interprets formulas from the modal language ML that is built from the
set P = {p, p′, . . .} of atomic formulas and the falsum (⊥) using negation
(¬), disjunction (∨), conjunction (∧), possibility (♦), and necessity (). We
refer to elements of this modal language as modal formulas. The semantics
of S5 is as follows:
Definition 3.1. An S5-model M (= 〈W,V 〉) consists of a nonempty set W
of possible worlds and a valuation function V that assigns to each atomic for-
mula p in P a subset V (p) of W . Let w ∈ W , let p ∈ P, and let ϕ,ψ ∈ ML.
2This distinction is also made by Cobreros et al. [6, Section 3].
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Then
M,w |=S5 p iﬀ w ∈ V (p)
M,w |=S5 ⊥
M,w |=S5 ¬ϕ iﬀ M,w |=S5 ϕ
M,w |=S5 ϕ ∨ ψ iﬀ M,w |=S5 ϕ or M,w |=S5 ψ
M,w |=S5 ϕ ∧ ψ iﬀ M,w |=S5 ϕ and M,w |=S5 ψ
M,w |=S5 ♦ϕ iﬀ there is a w′ in W such that M, w′ |=S5 ϕ
M,w |=S5 ϕ iﬀ for all w′ inW it holds that M,w′ |=S5 ϕ.
We write M |=S5 ϕ, if M,w |=S5 ϕ for all w in W . An argument from a
set Π of premises to a conclusion ϕ is S5-valid (notation: Π |=S5 ϕ) if and
only if for each S5-model M (= 〈W,V 〉) and each w in W it holds that if
M,w |=S5 ψ for all ψ in Π, then M,w |=S5 ϕ.
In an S5-model there are three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive
possibilities for each atomic formula p : either p is true in all possible worlds,
or p is true in some possible worlds and false in others, or p is false in all
possible worlds. Our Translation Manual ﬁrst maps the three possible truth-
values of any atomic formula p to these three possibilities, and then maps
the three possible truth-values of any complex formula ⊗n(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn) to
truth-functional combinations of the mapped truth-values of its constituent
formulas according to the strictures of ⊗n’s truth-table:
Definition 3.2. (Translation Manual) Let p ∈ P and let ϕ1, . . . ϕn ∈ LOP .
Then
a(p) = p
b(p) = ♦p ∧ ¬p
c(p) = ¬♦p
a(⊗n(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) =
∨
〈x1,...,xn〉∈a(f⊗n)
(x1(ϕ1) ∧ · · · ∧ xn(ϕn))
b(⊗n(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) =
∨
〈x1,...,xn〉∈b(f⊗n)
(x1(ϕ1) ∧ · · · ∧ xn(ϕn))
c(⊗n(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) =
∨
〈x1,...,xn〉∈c(f⊗n)
(x1(ϕ1) ∧ · · · ∧ xn(ϕn)),
where x(f⊗n) = {〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ {a, b, c}n : f⊗n(〈x1, . . . , xn〉) = x}.
Note that x(⊗n(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) = ⊥, if x(f⊗n) = ∅. Given a formula ϕ and a
set X ⊆ {a, b, c} of truth-values, we write X(ϕ) for ∨x∈X x(ϕ). (Again, note
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that X(ϕ) = ⊥, if X = ∅.) Similarly, given a set Π of formulas and a set
X ⊆ {a, b, c} of truth-values, we write X(Π) for {X(ψ) : ψ ∈ Π}.
Using our Translation Manual, we can now state the conditions under
which a three-valued valuation and an S5-model are translationally
equivalent.
Definition 3.3. Let v be a three-valued valuation on P and let M be an
S5-model. Then v and M are 3-equivalent, if for all ϕ in LOP it holds that
v∗(ϕ) = a iﬀ M |=S5 a(ϕ)
v∗(ϕ) = b iﬀ M |=S5 b(ϕ)
v∗(ϕ) = c iﬀ M |=S5 c(ϕ).
Note that if a three-valued valuation v and an S5-model M are 3-equivalent,
it holds for all ϕ in LOP and for all subsets X of {a, b, c} that v∗(ϕ) ∈ X if
and only if M |=S5 X(ϕ).
For each S5-model there is a 3-equivalent three-valued valuation and for
each three-valued valuation there is a 3-equivalent S5-model. To show this,
we need a lemma about the speciﬁc type of modal formulas that are gen-
erated by our Translation Manual. In fact, all translations of propositional
formulas are fully modalized, that is, for all ϕ in LOP it holds that a(ϕ),
b(ϕ), and c(ϕ) are in the modal sublanguage ML, where ML is built
from {♦p : p ∈ P}∪{p : p ∈ P}∪{⊥} using negation (¬), disjunction (∨),
and conjunction (∧). Fully modalized formulas have a special property: they
are true somewhere in an S5-model if and only if they are true everywhere
in that model (a straightforward structural induction proves this):
Lemma 3.1. Let M (= 〈W,V 〉) be an S5-model. Let w ∈ W and ϕ ∈ ML.
Then
M,w |=S5 ϕ iﬀ M |=S5 ϕ.
Lemma 3.2. For each S5-model there is a 3-equivalent three-valued valuation.
Proof. Let M (= 〈W,V 〉) be an S5-model. We construct a three-valued
valuation vM by stipulating that for all atomic formulas p in P
vM (p) = a iﬀ V (p) = W
vM (p) = b iﬀ V (p) = ∅ and V (p) = W
vM (p) = c iﬀ V (p) = ∅.
It is easy to see that vM is a three-valued valuation: vM assigns to each
atomic formula p exactly one of the truth-values a, b, and c.
We now show by structural induction on ϕ that vM and M are
3-equivalent.
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Basis. That the claim holds for atomic formulas follows directly from the
definition of vM , Definition 2.1, Lemma 3.1, and the semantics of S5.
Induction Hypothesis. Suppose that our theorem holds for all formulas ϕ
with less operators than the formula ⊗n(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn).
Induction Step. Consider ⊗n(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn). Suppose v∗M (⊗n(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) =
a. Then f⊗n(〈v∗M (ϕ1), . . . , v∗M (ϕn)〉) = a. Take an arbitrary ϕi and consider
v∗M (ϕi) = xi. By the Induction Hypothesis, it must be that M |=S5 xi(ϕi)
for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence, M |=S5 x1(ϕ1)∧ · · · ∧ xn(ϕn). It is clear that
〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ a(f⊗n). Therefore, M |=S5 a(⊗n(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)).
Suppose M |=S5 a(⊗n(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)). Then there is an n-tuple 〈x1, . . . , xn〉
in a(f⊗n) such that M |=S5 x1(ϕ1) ∧ · · · ∧ xn(ϕn). Hence, M |=S5 xi(ϕi)
for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By the Induction Hypothesis, it must be that
v∗M (ϕi) = xi for all i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore, v∗M (⊗n(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) =
f⊗n(〈v∗M (ϕ1), . . . , v∗M (ϕn)〉) = f⊗n(〈x1, . . . , xn〉) = a.
The cases for b and c are analogous.
Lemma 3.3. For each three-valued valuation there is a 3-equivalent S5-
model.
Proof. Let v be a three-valued valuation. We construct an S5-model Mv
(= 〈Wv, Vv〉) by stipulating that (1) Wv = {w,w′} and (2) for all atomic
formulas p in P
Vv(p) = Wv iﬀ v(p) = a
Vv(p) = {w} iﬀ v(p) = b
Vv(p) = ∅ iﬀ v(p) = c.
Obviously, Mv is an S5-model. An adaption of the inductive proof of
Lemma 3.2 shows that v and Mv are 3-equivalent.
We now prove our theorem that every truth-functional three-valued prop-
ositional logic can be conservatively translated into the modal logic S5:
Theorem 3.4. Let Π ⊆ LOP , let ϕ ∈ LOP , and let X,Y ⊆ {a, b, c}. Then
Π |=XY3 ϕ iﬀ X(Π) |=S5 Y(ϕ).
Proof. Suppose that X(Π) |=S5 Y(ϕ). Then there is an S5-model M
(= 〈W,V 〉) and a w in W such that M,w |=S5 X(ψ) for all ψ in Π and
M,w |=S5 Y(ψ). By Lemma 3.1 it follows that M |=S5 X(ψ) for all ψ in Π
and M |=S5 Y(ϕ). By Lemma 3.2 there is a three-valued valuation vM such
that v∗M (ψ) ∈ X for all ψ in Π and v∗M (ϕ) ∈ Y. Therefore, Π |=XY3 ϕ.
Suppose that Π |=XY3 ϕ. Then there is a three-valued valuation v such
that v∗(ψ) ∈ X for all ψ in Π and v∗(ϕ) ∈ Y. By Lemma 3.3 there is
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an S5-model Mv (= 〈Wv, Vv〉) such that Mv |=S5 X(ψ) for all ψ in Π and
Mv |=S5 Y(ϕ). By Lemma 3.1 there is a w in Wv such that Mv, w |=S5 X(ψ)
for all ψ in Π and Mv, w |=S5 Y(ϕ). Therefore, X(Π) |=S5 Y(ϕ).
In general, the length of the translations produced by our Translation
Manual is exponential, because a single step in the production of, say, the
a-translation of a complex formula built from an n-ary operator ⊗n might
comprise 3n clauses: if f⊗n(〈x1, . . . , xn〉) = a for all 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 ∈ {a, b, c}n,
then
a(⊗n(ϕ1, . . . , ϕn)) =
∨
〈x1,...,xn〉∈{a,b,c}n
(x1(ϕ1) ∧ · · · ∧ xn(ϕn)).
This fact raises the question whether there are three-valued logics for which
there is a shorter translation into S5. The answer is aﬃrmative: there is an
elegant linear conservative translation of the three-valued logics LP and K3
into the modal logic S5.
4. A Linear Translation of LP and K3 into S5
Translations of the Logic of Paradox (LP ) and Strong Three-Valued Logic
(K3) into modal logic have been oﬀered in the literature. Batens [1, p. 284]
gives essentially the same translation of LP into S5 as we do, but fails to
include a proof. Busch’s [3, p. 72] translation of K3 into modal logic only
applies to the fragment of the language of propositional logic that is built
from (negations of) atomic formulas using disjunction and conjunction, and
introduces unnecessary s in each step where a disjunction or a conjunc-
tion is treated. We present a single linear translation that conservatively
translates both LP and K3 into S5.
LP and K3 evaluate formulas and arguments from a propositional lan-
guage LOP , where P = {p, p′, . . .} and O = {¬1,∨2,∧2}. LP adds a third
truth-value ‘both’ to the classical pair ‘false’ and ‘true’. An LP -valuation is
a function vLP from the set P of atomic formulas to the set {{0}, {1}, {0, 1}}
of truth-values ‘false’, ‘true’, and ‘both’. K3 adds a third truth-value ‘none’
to the pair ‘false’ and ‘true’. A K3-valuation is a function vK3 from P to the
set {∅, {0}, {1}} of truth-values ‘none’, ‘false’, and ‘true’. An LP -valuation
vLP (a K3-valuation vK3) is extended to a valuation v
∗




on LOP as follows (where X stands for both LP and K3):
1 ∈ v∗X(p) iﬀ 1 ∈ vX(p)
0 ∈ v∗X(p) iﬀ 0 ∈ vX(p)
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1 ∈ v∗X(¬ϕ) iﬀ 0 ∈ v∗X(ϕ)
0 ∈ v∗X(¬ϕ) iﬀ 1 ∈ v∗X(ϕ)
1 ∈ v∗X(ϕ ∨ ψ) iﬀ 1 ∈ v∗X(ϕ) or 1 ∈ v∗X(ψ)
0 ∈ v∗X(ϕ ∨ ψ) iﬀ 0 ∈ v∗X(ϕ) and 0 ∈ v∗X(ψ)
1 ∈ v∗X(ϕ ∧ ψ) iﬀ 1 ∈ v∗X(ϕ) and 1 ∈ v∗X(ψ)
0 ∈ v∗X(ϕ ∧ ψ) iﬀ 0 ∈ v∗X(ϕ) or 0 ∈ v∗X(ψ).
An argument from a set Π of premises to a conclusion ϕ is X-valid (notation:
Π |=X ϕ), if and only if for each X-valuation vX it holds that if 1 ∈ v∗X(ψ)
for all ψ in Π, then 1 ∈ v∗X(ϕ). Note that in LP the set of designated
truth-values for both the premises and the conclusion is {{1}, {0, 1}}, and
that in K3 the set of designated truth-values for both the premises and the
conclusion is {{1}}.
5. Linear X-translations
Our translation transforms propositional formulas from LOP into modal for-
mulas from ML. Each propositional formula ϕ has both an LP -translation
LP (ϕ) and a K3-translation K3(ϕ). Both X and Y may stand for LP and
K3, but if X is the one logic, then Y is the other. In the course of ﬁnding
a propositional formula’s X-translation, we may have to use Y -translations
of its subformulas.3 Our translation is given by the following rules:
LP (p) = ♦p
K3(p) = p
X(¬ϕ) = ¬Y (ϕ)
X(ϕ ∧ ψ) = X(ϕ) ∧ X(ψ)
X(ϕ ∨ ψ) = X(ϕ) ∨ X(ψ).
If Π is a set of propositional formulas, X(Π) abbreviates {X(ψ) : ψ∈Π}.
Let us give two examples: LP (p ∧ ¬p) = ♦p ∧ ¬p and K3(p ∧ ¬p) =
p ∧ ¬♦p. An X-translation X(ϕ) hence leaves a propositional formula
ϕ’s negations, disjunctions, and conjunctions untouched, and only aﬀects
its atomic formulas: if an atomic formula p in ϕ is under the scope of an
even number of negations, then its translation is X(p). If p in ϕ is under the
scope of an odd number of negations, then its translation is Y (p). Hence,
3Our translation procedure using two interrelated types of translations of propositional
formulas is similar to van Benthem’s [16, p. 234] method for translating ‘data formulas’
into modal formulas.
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the length of an X-translation X(ϕ) equals the length of ϕ plus the num-
ber of atomic formula occurrences in ϕ. Therefore, X-translations are linear
translations.
Using our X-translations, we can now state the conditions under which
an X-valuation and an S5-model are translationally equivalent (again, X
and Y may stand for both LP and K3, but if X is the one logic, then Y is
the other):
Definition 5.1. Let vX be an X-valuation on P and let M be an S5-model.
Then vX and M are X-equivalent, if for all ϕ in LOP it holds that
1 ∈ v∗X(ϕ) iﬀ M |=S5 X(ϕ)
0 ∈ v∗X(ϕ) iﬀ M |=S5 Y (ϕ).
To show that the three-valued logics LP and K3 can be embedded in the
modal logic S5, it sufﬁces to show that for every S5-model there is a X-
equivalent X-valuation and that for every X-valuation there is a X-equiv-
alent S5-model. The embedding then follows easily.
Lemma 5.1. For each S5-model there is a X-equivalent X-valuation.
Proof. Let M (= 〈W,V 〉) be an S5-model. We construct a three-valued
X-valuation vXM by stipulating that for all atomic formulas p in P
vXM (p) = {1} iﬀ V (p) = W
vXM (p) =
{{0, 1} if X = LP
∅ if X = K3 iﬀ V (p) = ∅ and V (p) = W
vXM (p) = {0} iﬀ V (p) = ∅.
It is easy to see that vXM is an X-valuation: vXM assigns to each atomic
formula p exactly one of X’s three truth-values. By simultaneous struc-
tural induction and Lemma 3.1 it is easy to show that vXM and M are
X-equivalent.
Lemma 5.2. For each X-valuation there is a X-equivalent S5-model.
Proof. Let vX be an X-valuation. We construct an S5-model MvX (=
〈WvX , VvX 〉) by stipulating that (1) WvX = {w,w′} and (2) for all atomic
formulas p in P
VvX (p) = WvX iﬀ vX(p) = {1}
VvX (p) = {w} iﬀ vX(p) = {0} and vX(p) = {1}
VvX (p) = ∅ iﬀ vX(p) = {0}.
Obviously, MvX is an S5-model. An adaption of the inductive proof of
Lemma 5.1 shows that vX and MvX are X-equivalent.
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We now prove our theorem that our X-translations conservatively translate
LP and K3 into the modal logic S5:
Theorem 5.3. Let Π ⊆ LOP , let ϕ ∈ LOP , and let X be LP or K3. Then
Π |=X ϕ iﬀ X(Π) |=S5 X(ϕ).
Proof. Suppose X(Π) |=S5 X(ϕ). Then there is an S5-model M
(= 〈W,V 〉) and a w in W such that M,w |=S5 X(ψ) for all ψ in Π and
M,w |=S5 X(ϕ). By Lemma 3.1, it must be that M |=S5 X(ψ) for all ψ
in Π and M |=S5 X(ϕ). By Lemma 5.1, there is an X-valuation vXM such
that 1 ∈ v∗XM (ψ) for all ψ in Π and 1 ∈ v∗XM (ϕ). Therefore Π |=X ϕ.
Suppose that Π |=X ϕ. Then there is an X-valuation vX such that
1 ∈ v∗X(ψ) for all ψ in Π and 1 ∈ v∗X(ϕ). By Lemma 5.2, there is an S5-
model MvX (= 〈WvX , VvX 〉) such that MvX |=S5 X(ψ) for all ψ in Π and
MvX |=S5 X(ϕ). By Lemma 3.1, it must be that there is a w in WvX such
that MvX , w |=S5 X(ψ) for all ψ in Π and MvX , w |=S5 X(ϕ). Therefore
X(Π) |=S5 X(ϕ).
Which technical results and philosophical insights can be gained from
these linear conservative translations of LP and K3 into S5? As for the tech-
nical results, our theorem carries over some properties of modal logic to LP
and K3. Let us give one example from complexity theory. From the fact that
the complexity of the satisﬁability problem for S5 is NP-complete [12] and
the fact that our X-translations of LP and K3 are linear, it follows imme-
diately that the complexity of LP -validity and of K3-validity is in co-NP.4
As for the philosophical insights, our theorem contributes to the debate
on the ‘proper’ interpretation of LP . It shows that if we want a formal
semantics for LP , we do not need to endorse any form of dialetheism what-
ever (dialetheism is the claim that there are true contradictions): LP has a
classical, two-valued semantics and therefore need not be interpreted under
the assumption of dialetheism.5 Although negation, disjunction, and con-
junction in LP can all be rendered classically, atomic formulas in LP may
have different meanings, depending on whether they are under the scope of
an even or an odd number of negations. It is this holistic interpretation of
atomic formulas in LP that is the fundamental difference between classical
4Cadoli and Schaerf [4] show this for LP .
5Brown [2], Lewis [13], and Cobreros et al. [6] also argue that LP can be brought within
the range of classical logic. Their approach differs from ours in that, in order to make sense
of LP , they tentatively accept a weak form of LP ’s central tenet, that some formulas can
be both true and false.
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logic and LP . Priest’s [15] arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, we
showed that negation in LP can be understood as a negation that “satisﬁes
all the proof-theoretic rules of classical negation” [15, p. 203], provided we
determine the meaning of LP ’s atomic formulas by way of our X-translation
of LP into S5. As a consequence, Priest tells only half the story, as far as
LP ’s “theoretical account of negation” is concerned, when he says: “Dia-
letheic logic, unlike modal logic, does [...] provide a genuine rival theory to
that provided by classical logic” [15, p. 210]. He might just as well have said
that dialetheic logic provides a ‘rival theory’ of the interpretation of atomic
formulas.
6. Conclusion
Our Translation Manual can easily be adapted to handle n-valued logics
as long as we have a modal logic in which there are n mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive possibilities for each atomic formula p. For example,
every truth-functional four-valued propositional logic can be conservatively
translated into a modal logic interpreted on minimal models M = 〈W,N, V 〉
where N is a universal neighbourhood such that for each atomic formula p
it holds that (1) either [[p]] ∈ N or [[p]] ∈ N , and (2) either −[[p]] ∈ N or
−[[p]] ∈ N .6 Our adapted Translation Manual then maps the four possible
truth-values a, b, c, and d of any atomic formula p to these four possibilities:
a(p) = p∧♦p, b(p) = p∧¬♦p, c(p) = ¬p∧♦p, and d(p) = ¬p∧¬♦p.
The adapted Translation Manual’s handling of complex formulas and the
subsequent proof that the adapted Translation Manual conservatively trans-
lates any truth-functional four-valued propositional logic into minimal modal
logic closely follow the lines of our treatment of three-valued logics.
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